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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the State of Utah (Defendant-Appellant) is 
entitled to full reimbursement of its medicaid expenses of 
$15,018.41 from $20,000.00 recovered by Plaintiff-Respondent in a 
settlement with the insurance company of the third party tort-
feasor. 
2. Whether the State of Utah (Defendant-Appellant) 
should be required to pay any portion of the legal costs related 
to Plaintiff-Respondentfs settlement with the insurance company 
and subsequent litigation. 
3. Alternatively, if the decision of the lower court 
is upheld, whether a factual error made by the lower court in its 
computation of percentage relative to the allocation of the 
proceeds of the $20,000.00 recovery should be corrected. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant-Appellant appeals from a lower court decision 
thatf pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7, Defendant-Appellant 
was entitled only to $3,280.00 from a $20,000.00 third party 
settlement entered into by Plaintiff-Respondent, rather than the 
full $15,018.41 paid by Defendant-Appellant for medical expenses 
for Plaintiff-Respondentfs deceased. 
STATEMENT OF TEE FACTS 
Carol Camp, Plaintiff-Respondent, is the mother of 
Tammy Kadel. On June 15, 1985, Tammy Kadel was a passenger in a 
999Chevy Pickup driven by Anthony Shane Stevens. On 1-15 
9approximately ten miles north of Glendale, Nevada, Stevens 
negligently lost control of the pickup, and it rolled over. 
Tammy was thrown from the pickup as it rolled. After the acci-
dent, Tammy was taken to Valley Hospital in Las Vegas, Nevada. 
Tammy suffered multiple injuries including skull fracture, 
punctured lung, broken clavicle and various internal injuries. 
Tammy lived for six days, and died on June 21, 1985 as a result 
of her injuries. 
As a direct and proximate result of the accident, Tammy 
incurred medical expenses as follows: 
a. Valley Hospital Medical Center $32,069.55 
b. Doctors Emergency Medical Service 433.01 
c. Joseph Warpinski 1,040.00 
d. Radiology Associates of Nevada 819.00 
e. Cardiovascular Surgery Associates 433.00 
f. Cardiology Hospital Services 100.00 
g. Neurosurgical Associates 4,160.00 
TOTAL $39,054.56 
The State of Utah, through the Medical program, paid $15,018.41 
in full satisfaction of the medical expenses listed above, 
sometime after October 31, 1985. 
On July 23, 1985, Carol Camp retained Robert DeBry and 
Associates to represent her in her claim against Stevens, the 
driver. 
Stevens, the driver, was insured in th amount of 
$20,000.00 by Farmers Insurance Group. Donna Harmon of Farmers 
tendered policy limits of $20,000.00 to Robert DeBry and 
Associates on September 3, 1985. Sometime before October 14, 
1985, Farmers delivered a draft in the amount of $20,000.00 to 
Robert DeBry and Associates. The draft was then negotiated and 
the funds placed in the Robert DeBry Client Trust Account on or 
about November 20, 1985. The funds are currently in that trust 
account. 
On October 22, 1985, defendant sent a "Verified Lien 
Statement" to Robert DeBry and Associates which was received on 
October 24, 1985. At that time, defendant had made no payment of 
funds, and the lien was in no specific amount. On October 28, 
1985, Farmers received a copy of the lien statement from 
defendant. On January 18, 1986, Robert DeBry & Associates 
received a second lien statement in the amount of $15,018.41. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court below erred in its interpretation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 26-19-7 and its finding that, of $20,000.00 recovered 
by Plaintiff-Respondent against a third party, Defendant-
Appellant was not entitled to recoup its full medical assistance 
cost of $15,018.41. 
Because Plaintiff-Respondent violated the terms and 
conditions set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7 by taking 
unitary action to recover damages against a third party without 
the written consent of the State of Utah/ Defendant-Appellant 
cannot be required to share in any costs pursuant to Defendant-
Respondent's recovery or subsequent related actions. 
Alternatively, in the event this Court upholds the 
decision of the lower court, a factual error made by the lower 
court in its computation of percentages relative to the 
allocation of the $20,000.00 recovery should be corrected. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO FULL 
REIMBURSEMENT OF ITS MEDICAL EXPENSES FROM 
THE PROCEEDS OF PLAINTIFFfS INSURANCE RECOVERY 
Utah Code Annotated § 26-19-5(1) provides as follows: 
"If the department provides or becomes 
obligated to provide medical assistance to a 
recipient because of an injury, disease or 
disability for which a third party is liable, 
the department may recover the medical assistance 
from that third party." 
Utah Code Annotated § 26-19-7(1)(a) and (2) further 
provide that: 
"A recipient may not file a claim or commence 
an action against a third party for recovery of 
medical costs for an injury, disease, or disability 
for which the department has provided or has be-
come obligated to provide medical assistance 
without the department's written consent." 
* * * 
"If the recipient proceeds without the department's 
written consent as required by Subsection (1)(a), 
4 
the department is not bound by any decision, 
judgment/ agreement or compromise rendered or made 
on the claim or in the action, and the department 
may recover in full from the recipient all medical 
assistance which it has provided and shall maintain 
its right to commence an independent action 
against the third party, subject to Subsection 
26-19-5(3)." 
Subsection 26-19-5(3) provides, in part, that the 
department's claim "is not enforceable as to a third party unless 
(i) the third party receives the written notice of the 
department's claim before settling with the recipient, or (ii) in 
settling with the recipient the third party excludes the amount 
of the medical assistance." (See also Johnston County v. 
McCormick, 308 S.E.2d 872, 874, 875 (N.C. App. 1983)). 
On the case at bar, the Plaintiff-Respondent violated 
Subsection 26-19-7(1)(a) by filing and settling a claim against a 
third-party insurance company without either the written consent 
or even the knowledge of the department. The proceeds from that 
claim, of $20,000.00, represent the fully policy limits available 
against the tort-feasor driver. The District Court, in its 
Memorandum Decision correctly recognized that the $20,000.00 
represented less than the total value of the case (Exhibit A, 
Memorandum Decision, Page 3), but erred in apportioning the 
$20,000.00. The District Court determined the fair value of the 
case to be $91,554.56. The Court then reasoned that the 
$15,018.41 paid by the State in medical expenses represented 
16.4% of the total value of the damages. On that basis, the 
Court found the Defendant-Appellant entitled to recoup 16.4% of 
5 
the $20,000.00 that was actually available, or $3,280.00. 
(Exhibit A, p.5). This ruling violates the clear statutory 
requirement as set forth in Subsection 26-19-7(2), which provides 
that "the department may recover in full from the recipient all 
medical assistance which it has provided" in the event a 
recipient proceeds with a claim against a third party without the 
department's written consent. 
The correct outcome would to have been to reimburse the 
department the full $15,018.41 paid as medical assistance on 
behalf of the recipient. Although, in view of loss of life 
involved in this case, such a result may seem harsh, it is both 
fair and consistent with public policy as evidenced by a number 
of court decisions. 
A 1984 Indiana case is very much like the case at bar 
both as to the facts and the controlling state statutes. In 
Indiana v. Guardianship of Mclntyre, 471 N.E.2d 6 (Ind. App. 4 
Dist. 1984), a 16 year old passenger in an automobile suffered 
serious and permanent injuries. The Medicaid program, 
administered by a State Department, provided $49,320.40 for 
treatment of her injuries. The State filed a lien for this 
amount on any recovery obtained from the drivers or their 
insurers. Eventually, a trial court approved a settlement of 
$106,500.00. In apportioning the settlement, the trial court 
determined the State was entitled to only $15,000.00 in 
satisfaction of its lien. 
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In its appeal/ the State cited Indiana Codef 12-1-7-
24.6/ which/ rauch like Utah's statutory counterpart/ had recently 
replaced a subrogation provision. The new statute provides as 
follows: 
Sec. 24.6.(a) whenever: 
(1) the department pays medical expenses 
for or on behalf of a person who has been 
injured or has suffered an illness or disease 
as a result of the negligence or act of 
another person; and 
(2) the injured or diseased person asserts 
a claim against the other person for 
damages resulting from the injury/ illness* 
or disease; 
the department has a lien against the other person* 
to the extent of the amount paid by the department* 
on any recovery under the claim* whether by 
judgment/ compromise or settlement. 
(b) Whenever: 
(1) the department pays for medical 
expenses or renders medical services on 
behalf of a person who has been injured 
or has suffered an illness or disease; 
and 
(2) that person asserts a claim against 
any insurer as a result of his injury/ 
illness, or disease; 
the department has a lien against the insurer/ 
to the extent of the amount paid by the 
department, on any recovery from the insurer. 
471 N.E.2d at 8/ 9. (Emphasis as cited in Mclntyre). 
The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had 
erred by not allocating the full $49/320.40 paid by medicaid/ 
observing that: 
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"The Court must accord statutory 
words, phrases, and punctuation their plain, 
ordinary, and usual meaning. When the 
language used in the statute is clear and 
unambiguous and the intent of the legislative 
unmistakable, we must adopt the meaning plainly 
expressed." 
471 N.E.2d at 9. 
Utahfs statute is no less clear than Indiana's. 
Subsection 26-19-7(1)(a) clearly prohibits a recipient of 
medicaid assistance from filing "a claim or commencing an action 
against a third party for recovery of medical costs for an 
injury, disease, or disability for which the department has 
provided or has become obligated to provide medical assistance 
without the departments written consent." Subsection 26-19-7(2) 
makes it equally clear that if a recipient proceeds without the 
written consent as required by Subsection (1) (a) , "the department 
may recover in full from the recipient all medical assistance 
which it has provided . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(2). 
(Emphasis supplied). 
In spite of the Indiana Court of Appeals1 clarity in 
Indiana v. Guardianship of Mclntyre, a similar issue arose in 
Indiana Dept. of Public Welfare v. Larson, 486 N.E.2d 546 (Ind. 
App. 3 Dist. 1985). Confusion had once again arisen over the use 
of the term "lien" in the new statute, as opposed to the term 
"subrogation" in the prior statute. Here, as in Mclntyre* the 
Court determined that the use of equitable principles and 
discretion in determining reimbursement to the department for 
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medicaid benefits, and held that the state was entitled to 
reimbursement for the full amount of the lien, less an 
appropriate amount of attorney fees and expenses. (Such attorney 
fees and expenses are inappropriate in the case at bar, as will 
be shown under Point II.) 
Larson is useful in analyzing the facts and statutes 
relative to the case at bar in that it makes clear the difference 
between the "lien" approach and the "subrogation" approach to 
medicaid recovery. 
"A lien is a claim which one holds on9 
the property of another as security for 
an indebtedness or charge [citation omitted J. 
Therefore, the equitable principles and 
discretion in determining reimbursement 
pursuant to a subrogation statute do not 
apply to reimbursement to the State for the 
Medicaid benefits. The DPW is entitled to 
a lien for the full amount of its expendi-
tures on behalf of the recipient . . * ." 
486 N.E.2d at 548. (Emphasis added). 
Even though U.C.A. § 26-19-7 makes no express reference 
to the use of a lien, Subsection 26-19-13(1) makes clear the fact 
that the lien approach (as opposed to subrogation) is used in 
this state. The latter section provides that: 
"No lien or encumbrance shall be 
imposed against the property of a recipient 
before his death because of medical assistance 
correctly paid or to be paid on his behalf 
before he is 65 years of age, except as provided 
by Subsections 26-19-7(2) and (3)." 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-13(1). (Emphasis added). 
The reference to Subsections 26-19-7(2) and (3) ties 
the lien concept to those Subsections with all the legal 
implications that distinguish it from the equitable concept of 
subrogation. 
Inasmuch as Plaintiff-Respondent attempted/ in its 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Support of Plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Exhibit D, p.3) , to 
interpret Subsection 26-19-13(2) as a limitation on Defendant-
Respondent's right of recovery in the instant case, and 
apparently continues to hold that same position in its later 
Reply Brief (Exhibit C, p.5), some discussion as to Plaintiff-
Respondent's misapplication of this statute is in order. Two 
major and several minor points of clarification are useful: 
1. Subsection 26-19-13(2) cannot be read alone without 
also reading the other Subsections that accompany it. Subsection 
26-19-13(1) provides that: 
"No lien or encumbrance shall be imposed 
against the property of a recipient before his 
death because of medical assistance correctly 
paid or to be paid on his behalf before he is 
65 years of age, except as provided by Subsection 
26-19-7(2) and (3)." 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-13(1). (Emphasis added). 
This Subsection establishes at least two relevant 
points: First, Utah uses the "lien" approach as opposed to the 
"subrogation" approach. The significance of this distinction has 
already been discussed. Second, except as provided in Subsection 
26-19-7(2) and (3), it places a limitation on the use of liens 
against property before a recipient's death if he is under 65 
years of age. The Subsection says nothing about lien 
restrictions as to already deceased recipients who have not 
reached 65 years of age. 
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2. Subsection 26-19-13(2) sets forth restrictions 
relative to recovery against the estates of recipients who were 
65 years or older at death* It says nothing about recovering 
against the estate of a recipient who died before 65 years of 
age. 
Taking Subsections 26-19-13(1) and (2) together, two 
possible conclusions can be drawn: First/ neither of the 
Subsections actually limit the use of a lien or encumbrance 
against the estate of a recipient who died before reaching age 
65. In fact. Subsection 26-19-13(1) does not deal with estates 
at all, but/ rather/ the use of a lien or encumbrance against the 
property of a person yet living who has not yet reached 65 years 
of age. The Subsection then excepts property recovered from 
third parties pursuant to the circumstances set forth in 
Subsections 26-19-7(2) and (3). In other words, under the facts 
of the case at barf it is appropriate to impose a lien "against 
the property of a recipient before his death because of medical 
assistance correctly paid or to be paid on his behalf before he 
is 65 years of age . . . " Note that nothing is said in 
Subsection 26-19-13(1) about imposing a lien or encumbrance 
relative to a recipient after his death who was under 65 years of 
age. Since Subsection 26-19-13(2) speaks only of recovery 
against the estate of a recipient who was 65 years of age or 
older, one must conclude that the statute does not restrict/ in 
any wayf the use of a lien against the estate of a person who 
never reached 65 years of age. 
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Second, there is considerable room for doubt that in 
cases like the one at bar that the lien is actually imposed upon 
the estate of the deceased to begin with. In a recent California 
case, that state asserted medical liens for amounts expended for 
medical services rendered to a decedent recipient against the 
settlement proceeds in a wrongful death action brought by the 
decedent's husband and son. Shelton v. Fresno Community Hospital 
(State), 219 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. App. 5 Dist. 1985). The Court 
found that: " . . . a recovery in a wrongful death action may 
not be deemed a part of the estate of a decedent . . . [A] 
recovery in a wrongful death action was not a recovery of a 
portion of the estate or for the injuries inflicted on the 
decedent, but rather for injuries actually suffered by the heirs 
of the decedent by reason of the latterfs death." 219 Cal. Rptr. 
at 726. 
The case at bar also involved a wrongful death action 
brought by Plaintiff-Respondent and settled with the third party 
tort-feasor's insurance carrier. Accordingly, Defendant-
Appellant submits that there is no substance to Plaintiff-
Respondent's argument that Subsection 26-19-13(2) limits, in any 
way, the State's right of recovery from the settlement proceeds. 
Plaintiff-Respondent attempted, in its argument before 
the lower court, to equate a New Jersey statute with the 
pertinent Utah statute in order to reach the same result as found 
in Hedgebeth v. Hedford, 378 A.2d 226 (N.J. 1977). (Exhibit C, 
12 
p.l). In Hedgebetht the New Jersey court found that, under the 
New Jersey statute, the State had two avenues of recovery: a 
direct right of recovery against the tort-feasor, and or to seek 
recovery by way of the Medicaid recipient through a right of 
subrogation. 378 A.2d at 228. 
The New Jersey court's interpretation of the New Jersey 
statute is correct. N.J.S.A. 30:4D-7(j) provides that: "in any 
case where such legal liability is found the department [of human 
services] shall be subrogated to the rights of the individual for 
whom medical assistance was made available." (Emphasis added). 
But, both Utah and Indiana have amended their statutes so as to 
remove the subrogation provision. And, in Utah/ as in Indiana, 
"the equitable principles and discretion in determining 
reimbursement pursuant to a subrogation statute do not apply to 
reimbursement to the State for the Medicaid benefits." 486 
N.E.2d at 548. 
Although, as contended by Plaintiff-Respondent, a 
number of states1 statutes provide for a direct right of recovery 
and a subrogation right as to the medicaid recipient, neither 
Utah nor Indiana are among those states. Both now have statutes 
that clearly require full recovery from third party settlements 
of all medical assistance provided by Medicaid. U.C.A. § 26-19-
7(2) and Indiana Code 12-1-7-24.6(a) and (b). And, "when the 
language is clear and unambiguous and the intent fo the 
legislature unmistakable, we must adopt the meaning plainly-
expressed." 471 N.E.2d at 9. 
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Plaintiff-Respondent also fails to properly distinguish 
the Federal statutes as applied in Cockerham v. Garuim, 768 F.2d 
784 (6th Cir. 1985). 42 U.S.C.A. § 2651 provides that: "the 
United States shall have a right to recovery from said third 
person the reasonable value of the care and treatment so 
furnished or to be furnished and shall, as to this right be. 
subrogated to any right or claim that the injured or diseased 
person, his guardian, personal representative, estate, 
dependents, or survivors has against such third person to the 
extent of the reasonable value of the care or treatment so 
furnished or to be furnished." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2651. (Emphasis 
added) . 
In Cockerham, the Government had only subrogation 
rights as to the recipient's recovery against the third-party 
tort-feasor, and had passively allowed the recipient to bear all 
risks and costs of pursuing litigation for recovery. In the case 
ct bar, the lower court correctly found that: "Defendant's right 
of recovery is not an equitable right of subrogation which arises 
only after the injured person is made whole." (Exhibit B, Order 
of the Third Judicial District Court, October 16, 1986, p.l) . 
(Emphasis added). The basis for this appeal is that the lower 
court then contradicted its own finding and seemingly applied 
equitable principles in apportioning the proceeds of the 
settlement rather than following the clear requirement of the 
statute and allowing full recovery by the State against the 
proceeds of the settlement. Furthermore, unlike the Cockerham 
case, the Defendant-Appellant in the case at bar did not stand by 
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passively while the recipient bore the risks of litigation. 
Rather, the Plaintiff-Respondent committed a clear violation of 
Utah law by bringing its own action against the third party tort-
feasor and settling without the statutorily required written 
consent of the State, thus attempting to usurp the State's direct 
right of recovery. 
Subsection 26-19-7(2) of the Utah statute was enacted 
to prevent precisely the sort of act committed by Plaintiff-
Respondent in the case at bar. Under that Subsection the 
Defendant-Appellant is not bound by the settlement entered into 
by Plaintiff-Respondent, and/ thus, retains its direct right of 
recovery status under which it is entitled to full recovery of 
"all medical assistance which it has provided" from the proceeds 
of the settlement. 
Plaintiff-Respondent's attempt to compare New York's 
statutes to Utah's statutes also fails in that, even though the 
New York statute may make no mention the word "subrogation", it 
clearly limits the State's right to reimbursement and is 
structured entirely different than Utah's statute. For example, 
N.Y. Soc. Ser. Law § 104(2) provides that: 
"No right of action shall accrue 
against a person under twenty-one years of 
age by reason of the assistance or care 
granted to him unless at the time it was 
granted the person was possessed of money 
and property in excess of his reasonable 
requirements, taking into account his 
maintenance, education, medical care and 
any other factors applicable to his educa-
tion." 
15 
Because, in New York, "an infant's cause of action is 
property within the meaning of section 104(2)," and because "an 
award for personal injuries compensates for loss by providing a 
fund to meet anticipated needs caused by the injury, this fund 
can never be considered 'money or property in excess of his 
reasonable requirements'." Kidney by Kidney v. Kolmar 
Laboratories, 652 P. Supp. 15, 16, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Other New 
York statutes also limit, in various ways, the effects of liens 
against personal injury claims of public assistance recipients. 
Utah's statutes must be read on their own terms and 
given their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning. Contrary to the 
conclusion drawn by Plaintiff-Respondent's counsel (Exhibit C, 
p.2), the distinctions between statutes providing for a direct 
right of recovery and those which do not is of profound legal 
significance. (Exhibit C, p.2). 
Plaintiff-Respondent's argument turns largely upon a 
strained and illogical interpretation it attempts to give to 
U.C.A. § 26-19-7(2). This subsection provides, in part, that: 
"A recipient may not file a claim or commence an action against a 
third party for recovery of medical costs . . . without the 
department's written consent." (Emphasis added). Plaintiff-
Respondent's counsel construes this provision to mean that a 
recipient can manipulate a claim or settlement with the tort-
feasor or a third-party insurance carrier so as to omit any 
mention of medical expense recovery. Thus, "a settlement of any 
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other item of damage [other than medical costs incurred by 
the[recipient] gives defendant no right of recovery at all." 
(Exhibit C, p.3). For, "defendant's right of recovery is 
triggered only if plaintiff recovers medical expenses." (Id.) 
"Thus, under the statutory scheme, a mixed settlement should give 
defendant only a partial right." (Id.) The last statement 
reflects the position apparently taken by the lower court. 
Plaintiff-Respondent's counsel asks us, in effect, to 
believe that the legislature, by enacting Section 26-19-7, 
intended to create a situation where a Medicaid recipient could 
receive staggering sums of state medical assistance, and then 
tailor his or her recovery against a tort-feasor or insurer as to 
exclude any mention of "medical costs", and, thereby, preclude 
the possibility that public funds so expended could be recouped. 
The ordinary taxpayer would find that notion ludicrous. 
Credulity is strained beyond reasonable limits in trying to 
imagine that the legislature could have intended such an effect. 
In Peters v. Weatherwax, 731 P.2d 157, 162 (Hawaii 1987), the 
Hawaii Supreme Court recognized that such a result is precluded 
under the equitable principle of unjust enrichment. 
Nor can it be seriously asserted that the legislature 
could have intended the approach taken by the lower court. The 
clear meaning of Subsection 26-19-7(2) is that, if a Medicaid 
recipient pre-empts the State's direct right of action against a 
liable third party, "the department is not bound by any decision, 
judgment, agreement, or compromise rendered or made on the claim 
or in the action, and the department may recover in full from the 
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maintain its right to commence an independent action against the 
third party . . . " U.C.A. § 26-19-7(2). 
Plaintiff-Respondent's argument that the provisions of 
U.C.A. § 26-19-1 and 7(1)(a) require apportionment between 
recovery for special and general damages is without merit. As 
argued in Defendant's Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, (Exhibit D, p.5), "This language 
deals only with the relative rights of either party to proceed 
against third parties and does not in any way speak to the rights 
of settlement between the parties." 
Even if the lower court was correct in its conclusion 
that only a portion of the $20,000.00 settlement represented 
medical expenses, it erred in holding that only 16.4% of the 
$20,000.00 should be paid to the State. For, if any portion of 
the $20,000.00 can be said to be for medical costs, then, even 
under the interpretation given by Plaintiff-Respondent's counsel, 
the Plaintiff-Respondent must be considered to have filed "a 
claim or [commenced] an action against a third party for recovery 
of medical costs . . . without the defendant's written consent." 
U.C.A. $ 26-19-7(1)(a). Plaintiff-Respondent, in its Reply 
Brief, acknowledges this point: "Under U.C.A. § 26-19-7(2), 
defendant's right of recovery is triggered only if plaintiff 
recovers medical expenses." (Exhibit C, p.3). If that is true 
(and the lower court's decision acknowledges that it is), then, 
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the provisions of Subsection 26-19-7(2) are triggered, and "The 
department is not bound . . . and the department may recover in 
full from the recipient all medical assistance which it has 
provided . . ." 
The foregoing observations aside, in interpreting 
statutes, the legislative will is the controlling factor. United 
States v. N.E. Rosenblum Truck Lines, Inc., 315 U.S. 50, 86 L.Ed 
671, 62 S. Ct. 445 (1941). And, it is the duty of the courts, 
when engaging in statutory construction, to interpret the words 
of the statute in light of the purposes the legislature sought to 
serve. Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority v. 
Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co., 464 U.S. 30, 78 L.Ed.2d 29, 104 
S. Ct. 304 (1983); Board of Educ. of Granite School Dist v. Salt 
Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030 (1983). 
Plaintiff-Respondent's counsel attempts to sweep away 
as inapplicable a number of cases cited in Defendant-Appellant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Exhibit C, p.4). No doubt 
Plaintiff-Respondentfs counsel wishes the cited cases did not 
exist, for each is relevant to the issues presented in the case 
at bar, and each supports Defendant-Appellant's position. 
Indiana Department of Public Welfare v. Guardianship of Mclntyre, 
471 N.E.2d 6 (Ind. App. 1984), along with Indiana Dept. of Public 
Welfare v. Larson, 486 N.E.2d 546 (Ind. App. 3 Dist. 1985), has 
already been discussed supra. Their relevance is apparent from 
that discussion. Coplien v* Dept. of Health & Social Services, 
349 N.W.2d 92 (Wis. App. 1984), demonstrates that even when a 
state statute subrogates a state Medicaid claim to the rights of 
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a recipient/ an additional statutory provision that Medicaid 
assistance, together with reasonable costs of collection is to be 
deducted from any third party settlements, "and the remainder 
paid to the public assistance recipient." 349 N.W.2d at 93. 
Coplien is also useful in its observation regarding the statutory 
scheme set up by 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(18), (25) that: "there is 
no indication . . . that the agency is limited to recovering a 
pro rata share of the settlement proceeds." 349 N.W.2d at 94. 
And Coplien distinguishes several cases which denied state 
agencies full reimbursement of medical assistance payments where 
recipients had not been made whole by their settlements with 
liable third parties, then notes that the Wisconsin statute 
specifically provides that normal subrogation principles are not 
to be applied to an agency seeking reimbursement of medical 
assistance payments. 349 N.W.2d at 95. Thus, even statutes that 
provide for subrogation of the state to the recipient may also 
provide for full Medicaid reimbursement from third party recovery 
when the statute so specifies. Therefore, even if Plaintiff-
Respondent were correct in asserting that the State of Utah has 
only a subrogation right as to the recipient, that assertion 
would still be overcome by the express language of the statute 
that requires full recovery from the recipient in fact situations 
such as those present in the case at bar. U.C.A. § 26-19-7(2). 
(See also Dehaven v. Dan-Co FS Co-Qp, 383 N.W.2d 509 (Wis. App. 
1986)). 
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While it is true that Wright v. Department of Benefit 
Payments, 153 Cal. Rptr. 474 (App. 1979), and Brown v, Stewart, 
181 Cal. Rptr. 112 (App. 1982) were decided under California 
Statutes and involved somewhat different issues than presented in 
the case at bar, they, nonetheless, clarify important legal 
principles that are relevant here. Wright demonstrates that, 
when a statute clearly calls for full Medicaid reimbursement from 
third party settlements, the courts are not at liberty to erode a 
state's right to full recovery. Brown v* Stewart demonstrates, 
among other things, that statutes requiring reimbursement of 
medical payments from recovery in third party suits or claims 
permit no judicial discretion. (See Exhibit C, p.4). 
Plaintiff-Respondent also questioned the relevance of 
Hallmark Nursing Center, Inc. v. Menaldino, 452 N.Y.S.2d 694 
(App. Div. 1982) and Marmorino v. Newark Housing Authority, 461 
A.2d 171 (N.J. 1983). (See Exhibit C, p.4). These cases were 
cited by Defendant-Respondent to demonstrate the general 
underlying public policy woven into both Federal and State 
statutes: when a medical recipient's need to be compensated for 
their injuries is weighed against the need to conserve public 
funds, the public funds have priority. (See Exhibit D, p.4). 
POINT II 
NO COSTS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO 
THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT AGAINST 
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
Utah Code Annotated § 26-19-7(3), (4) provides that: 
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"The department's written consent, if given, 
shall state under what terms the interest of the 
department may be represented in an action 
commenced by the recipient." 
"The department may not pay more than 33% 
of its total recovery for attorney's fees, but 
shall pay its proportionate share of the cost 
of any action commenced in compliance with this 
section." (Emphasis added). 
Had the settlement reached between the Plaintiff-
Respondent and the third party's insurer been sanctioned by the 
Defendant-Appellant in the manner clearly set forth in Subsection 
26-19-7(1)(a), there is no question that, under the terms of 
Subsection 26-19-7(4), Defendant-Appellant would have been 
obligated to pay up to 33% of its recovery for attorney's fees. 
But Subsection 26-19-7(4) adds that such payment is to be made 
only as to "any action commenced in compliance with this 
section." Plaintiff-Respondent's action was clearly not 
commenced in compliance with this section. The State did not 
give consent, written or otherwise, for Plaintiff-Respondent to 
file a claim or commence an action. Rather, Plaintiff-Respondent 
proceeded in direct violation of the statutory requirement and 
now seeks to benefit from its own wrongdoing by seeking, not only 
the avoidance of a lawful debt owed to the State of Utah, but, to 
recover, from the State of Utah, the costs associated with its 
unlawful act. 
One of the purposes for the written consent requirement 
is to avoid actions such as are before this court. Had the State 
been involved (as required by the statute) prior to the 
settlement of the claim with the insurance company, then the 
State could have negotiated directly to protect its right and 
would have participated in the settlement. Clearly, the effect 
of Subsection 26-19-7(4) is to remove cases such as the one at 
bar from the Common Fund common law doctrines, and no costs 
should be awarded to Plaintiff-Respondent out of the State's 
share of the recovery. 
POINT III 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
IS ENTITLED TO A PRO-RATA REIMBURSEMENT 
FOR ALL MEDICAL EXPENSES 
Should the Court refuse to recognize the argument in 
Point I and allow the State only a pro-rata reimbursement of 
their expenses based on the Court's finding of the probable total 
damages, then a mistake of fact in the memorandum decision should 
be corrected. The Court stated at page 4 of the decision that 
the total medical expenses were $39,054.56 and that the State's 
$15,018.41 is included in that amount. As indicated in the State 
of Stipulated Facts submitted to the Court for this decision at 
paragraphs 3 and 4, the State's $15,018.41 paid the $39,054.56 in 
full and was full satisfaction thereof. The plaintiff paid no 
medical expenses whatsoever which are before this Court. 
Therefore defendant respectfully requests that the 
Court either reduce the total damages by $24,036.15 from 
$91,554.56 to $67,518.41 or give the State credit for the entire 
$39,054.56 in determining the amount of pro-rata reimbursement 
the defendant is entitled to. This would either allow a 22% or 
43% reimbursement to the State. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis, Defendant-Respondent 
respectfully requests that the decision of the lower court be 
reversed. 
DATED this -^to day of August, 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
^D^J^ TiS. 
DOUGLAS W. SPRINGMEYE 
Assistant Attorney General 
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I certify that I hand delivered four (4) true and 
correct copies of the Brief of the Appellant to the office of 
Daniel F. Bertch at 4001 South 700 East, Fifth Floor, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84107 on the 26th day of August, 1987. 
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This matter is submitted to the Court for decision, based 
upon the Affidavits and other pleadings in the file upon stipu-
lation of counsel. The Court has reviewed the pleadings and 
the Affidavits, and being otherwise fully advised, enters the 
following Memorandum Decision on the remaining issues. 
This matter originally started as a declaratory action 
wherein the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment declaring 
that the defendant had no right or interest in settlement proceeds 
that the plaintiff had received from a liability insurance carrier 
as a result of the death of her daughter in an automobile accident 
in Nevada on June 15, 1985. The defendant responded, agreeing 
that the matter should be resolved by way of a declaratory action, 
and asserted its claim for medical benefits paid on behalf of 
the deceased daughter in the amount of $15,018.41. 
EXHIBIT A 
(JAKUIJ UAPUr', 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OFFICE OF RECOVERY SERVICES, 
of the Utah State Department 
of Social Services, a Depart-
ment of the State of Utah, 
Defendants. 
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After the issues had been joined, the plaintiff brought 
a Motion for Summary Judgment. Following briefing and argument 
of the issues raised in the Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
Court granted in part and denied in part the Motion for Summary 
Judgment. In the Court's Order of October 16, 1986, the specifics 
on the Motion for Summary Judgment were enumerated. In summary, 
the Court determined by that Order that the plaintiff's rights 
were determined by Utah law, not Nevada law; that the defendant's 
right of recovery was not an equitable right of subrogation 
which arises only after the injured person is made whole, but 
rather the defendant has an absolute right of recovery for proceeds 
that represent settlement of medical expenses. The Court further 
held in its Order that the defendant's right of recovery does 
not extend to proceeds received in settlement of other items 
of damages for wrongful death. The Court then reserved two 
issues for resolution. First: does the settlement received 
from the driver's insurance carrier by the deceased's mother, 
the plaintiff herein, include reimbursement for medical expenses, 
and, second: if so, how much of the settlement includes reimburse-
ment for medical expenses. 
It is not in dispute that the total amount of settlement 
proceeds received from the motor vehicle operator's insurance 
carrier was $20,000.00. The $20,000.00 represents the full 
policy limits that would be available against the tort-feasor. 
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In view of the nature of the injuries and subsequent death of 
the plaintiff's daughter, it is clear to the Court that the 
amounts received in settlement, to wit: $20,000.00, representing 
the full policy limits of the driver's insurance represent less 
than the total value of the case. The acceptance of the policy 
limits was a matter of practicality on the part of the plaintiff, 
as opposed to a representation of the fair value of the plaintiff's 
wrongful death claim resulting out of the death of her daughter. 
Accordingly, the Court must determine, based upon the matters 
before it in the file what the fair full value of the plaintiff's 
claim would have been for the wrongful death of her daughter. 
The Court is aware of the amount claimed by the defendant, and 
the defendant should then be entitled to receive the proportionate 
share of the $20,000.00 settlement representing the percentage 
of the medical bills it paid to the value of the claim in total. 
The plaintiff has submitted an Affidavit of Robert B. Hansen 
wherein he estimates the value of this case at $150,000.00. 
The Court is also aware of values of these and similar types 
of cases as they come before the Court. The facts which could 
be used to evaluate the case are contained in Mr. Hansen's Affi-
davit. Recoverable damages for death of a minor include a number 
of elements. A finder of fact may consider the pecuniary benefits 
that the plaintiff, Carol Camp, in this case would with reasonable 
certainty have received from the earnings and services during 
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her daughter's minority which would have extended for two more 
years from the date of her death. Also to be considered is 
the support and financial benefit which the plaintiff would 
have received with reasonable certainty after the child reached 
her majority, and during the period of the parent and child's 
common expectancy of life. Additionally to be considered is 
the pecuniary loss suffered in the future by being deprived 
of the comfort, society and protection of the child. The finder 
of fact must consider the age of the deceased, and of her mother, 
and the state of health and physical condition of each at the 
time of the daughter's death. Funeral expenses and medical 
expenses are likewise recoverable. 
After careful consideration in this matter, it is the Court's 
determination that a finder of fact would assess all of the 
liability for the accident upon the driver, and that there would 
be no set-off of the plaintiff's recovery by way of comparative 
negligence, or otherwise. It appears that medical expenses 
associated with the deceased daughter's care total $39,054.56. 
That figure apparently includes the $15,018.41 claimed by the 
defendant. It also appears that the deceased's funeral created 
expenses in the amount of $2,500.00. The Court is satisfied 
that special damages for medical expenses and funeral expenses 
would then total $41,554.56. In addition to special damages, 
the recovery in this matter would include general damages. 
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Taking into account the elements allowed under Utah law for 
the recovery of general damages in a wrongful death suit, and 
taking into account the particular facts and circumstances of 
this case to the extent that they have been made known to the 
Court, it is the Court's opinion that a fair and reasonable 
amount for general damages would be $50,000.00. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court determines that the 
fair value of this case for both special and general damages 
is $91,554.56. The amount claimed by the defendant, to wit: 
$15,018.41 represents .164% of the total amount of damages, 
or the total value of this case. Accordingly, the defendant 
is entitled to recoup from the plaintiff .164% of the $20,000.00 
that was actually available, or $3,280.00. That figure, together 
with any interest that may have accumulated while this matter 
has been pending and the funds being held by the plaintiff's 
counsel are to be delivered over to the defendant as full satis-
faction of its claims as set forth in this suit. 
Counsel for the plaintiff is to prepare an appropriate 
Order in accordance with this Memorandum Decision, and submit 
the same to the Court for signature and review in accordance 
with the Local Rules of Practice. 
Dated this ^ day of March, 1987. 
M 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this day of March, 1987: 
Daniel F. Bertch 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Douglas W. Springmeyer 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant 
23 6 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL CAMP, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OFFICE OF RECOVERY SERVICES, 
of the Utah State Department } 
of Social Services, a Depart-
ment of the State of Utah, 
Defendant. 
f ORDER 
i Civil 
i JUDGE 
No. C86-377 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Plaintiff1s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
was heard before the Court on September 8, 1986. After 
hearing argument of counsel for both parties and considering 
the briefs submitted, it is hereby ORDERED: 
1. Plaintiff*s rights are determined by Utah 
law, not Nevada law. 
2. Defendant's right of recovery is not an 
equitable right of subrogation which arises only after the 
injured person is made whole. 
3. Defendant has an absolute right of recovery 
for proceeds in settlement of medical expenses. This right 
of recovery does not extend to proceeds in settlement of 
other items of damage. 
4. The Court reserved ruling on the other points 
raised by the parties. 
5. The .issues remaining in this case are: 
(a) Does the Camp settlement include reimburse-
ment of medical expenses; and 
(b) If so, how much of the settlement includes 
reimbursement of medical expenses. 
6. An evidentiary hearing shall be held to 
receive evidence concerning the damages which the settlement 
/ 
in question represents. 
DATED this day of (OWKh , 1986. 
Approved as t o form: 
^ u ^ f / \.J%&lA W 
at CT*-u!yO** 
DOWLAS W. SPR^NGMfiYl 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IK AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL CAMP, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OFFICE OF RECOVERY SERVICES, 
of the Utah State Department 
of Social Services, a Depart-
ment of the State of Utah, 
Defendant. 
REPLY 
) Civil 
) JUDGE 
BRIEF 
No. C86-377 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Plaintiff submits the following brief in reply to 
defendant's memorandum opposing summary judgment. 
THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE 
DEFENDANT'S DIRECT RIGHT OF RECOVERY 
Defendant has two avenues of recovery: a direct 
right of recovery against the tortfeasor (U.C.A., 26-19-5 (1) 
and a right of recovery against the recipient (U.C.A., 
26-19-7(2)). Defendant claims that because it has a direct 
right of recovery against tortfeasors, equitable consid-
erations do not apply to its right of recovery against the 
recipient. In fact, this very argument was addressed and 
r^jo — e-: in r'.cdgebeth v. Medford, 57S A.2d 2?f '*•:.'., 1 9 " ) . 
The main thrust of the State's argument 
is related to the fact that it has an 
independent right of recovery under the 
act. . .But there is no reason to 
believe that the existence of an inde-
pendent right of recovery by the State 
should affect the equitable nature of 
the State's right where it seeks reim-
bursement through subrogation. 
Id. at 230. Defendant's direct right of recovery may not be 
limited by any equitable considerations. However, when it 
seeks reimbursement from the beneficiary, equity governs. 
Defendant attempts to distinguish the cases cited 
by plaintiff on the ground that the particular statutes 
involved did not create a direct right cf recovery. That 
simply is not true. In fact, most of the statutes (like 
Utah) provide for a direct right of recovery in addition to 
an equitable right against the Medicaid recipient. See Ala. 
Code (1975), §22-6-6(a) and 6(b); N.J.S.A. 30:4d-7(j); N.Y. 
Sec. Serv. Law, §104 and 104(b) (McKinney, 1968). Some 
provide only for equitable subrogation, N.M.S.A., §13-1-20.1. 
The similar Federal statute (for recovery of 
federal money spent for medical expenses) contains both a 
direct right of recovery against the tortfeasor and a right 
cf reimbursement from the recipient. 42 U.E.C.A. 2651. 
'.'."her. the Federal government proceeds against the recipient, 
e~;itat le principles apply. Cockerham v. Garvin, 76S F.2d 
7S4 (6th Cir. 1985). The distinction between statutes 
providing for a direct right of recovery and those which do 
r.ct is of no apparent legal significance. 
Defendant further asserts that the absence of the 
word "sv.brccstion" ccmoels the Court to cive it full 
reimbursement. Again, the distinction is of no signifi-
cance. For example, New Yorkfs statute gives the State a 
direct right of reimbursement up to the amount of aid 
received. Social Services Law, §104 and 104(b). No mention 
is made of the word "subrogation," yet only that portion of 
the settlement containing medical expenses can be recovered. 
APPORTIONMENT OF THE SETTLEMENT 
IS REQUIRED BETWEEN MEDICAL EXPENSES AND ALL 
OTHER DAMAGES WITHOUT REGARD TO EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES 
This case does not necessarily involve equitable 
principles. Under U.C.A., §26-19-7(2), defendant's right of 
recovery is triggered only if plaintiff recovers medical 
expenses. A settlement of any other item, of damage gives 
defendant no right of recovery at all. Thus, under the 
statutory scheme, a mixed settlement should give defendant 
only a partial right. Defendant only can recover from 
plaintiff to the extent that the settlement includes medical 
expense paid by defendant. 
Furthermore, the documents attached to defendant's 
response reveal that plaintiff had no claim for mecical 
expense ar the time she settled. This is because she had 
previously assigned those rights to defendant. Her settle-
ment cannot include medical expenses because she had as-
signed her claim for medical expenses to defendant prior to 
settlement. Defendant still has those rights and may still 
proceed against Shane Stevens to recover mecical expenses 
THE CASES CITED IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT'S POSITION ARE 
INAPPLICABLE TO THE QUESTION INVOLVED 
The cases cited by defendant in support of its 
position do not apply to the issues in this case. 
Indiana Department of Public Welfare v. Guardian-
ship of r'clntyre, 471 N.E.2d 6 (Ind. App. 1984) and Coplien 
v. Department of Health and Social Services, 34 9 N.W.2d 9 2 
(Wis. 1984) both involve a statute which specifically sets 
forth relative priorities to settlement proceeds. 
Wright v. Department of Benefit Payments, 153 Cal. 
Rptr. 4 74 (App. 1979) , and Brown v. Stewart, 181 Cal. Rptr. 
112 (App. 1982) were decided within the context of a statu-
tory system that limits the State1s recover to one-half of 
the recovery after attorneyfs fees. Cal. Welfare Code, 
§14124.78 (1976). Furthermore, neither case involves the 
precise issue raised in this case of the State!s priority to 
settlement proceeds. 
Hallmark Nursing Center, Inc. v. Menaldino, 452 
N.Y.S.2d 694 (App. Div. 1982) involves the allocation of 
medical expense recovery between a hospital and the State 
and does net in anyway involve a recovery which includes 
general damages, or the rights of the injured party. 
Finally, Marmorino v. Newark Housing Authority, 461 A.2d 171 
(N.J. 1983) addresses the interplay between the abolition of 
the collateral source rule and Medicaid's right of recovery, 
a question not involved in this case. 
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL DID NOT FAIL TO CITE A 
PORTION OF THE RELEVANT STATUTE; DEFENDANT'S 
COUNSEL IN FACT CITES THE WRONG SECTION OF THE STATUTE 
Defendant claims that plaintiff failed to cite all 
of U.C.A., §26-19-13(1), specifically the portion of that 
section which refers to defendant's rights against the 
recipient. Defendant's counsel is citing the wrona section! 
* -
Plaintiff relies on 26-19-13 (2) , not on 26-19-13(1) . 
Plaintiff cited only 26 -13(2) to the Court. One only 
hopes that defendant's mistaken insinuation is unintention-
al. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should allow defendant to share in the 
recovery only to the extei it i t represents recovery of 
medical expense. This result is reached either by equitable 
principles, or by simple statutory construction. Alterna-
tively, under 26-19-13(2), defendant is barred from recover-
ing at all against the estate of Tammy Kadel. On that 
ground, defendant has no right of recovery. Plaintiff prays 
for a declaration cf the rights between her and defendant. 
DATED this <£> day of i, U-/l/t~n*i. Qx'Y 1986. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
By: J /.. IM<S. • (/IW-
' DANIEL F. 3ERTCH 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing P.EPLY BRIEF (Camp v. Office of Recovery Services) 
was mailed, U.S. Mai ] , postage prepaid, this ^ day of 
/jcpt , 1986, to the following: 
David L. Wilkinson 
Attorney General 
Douglas W. Springmeyer 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84il4 
" // 
EXHIBIT D 
DAVID I WILKINSON £34 72 
Attorney General 
Douglas W. Springmeyer, £3067 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: 533-7620 
I! i TEE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL CAMP, ) MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
Plaintiff, ) FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
-vs~ ) JUDGE HANSON 
OFFICE OF RECOVERY SERVICES, ) Civil No, C-86-377 
et. a] 
) 
Defendants, 
Coines now the defendant and respectfully moves 
the Cc i ir t: t c ! d = : y t: i -e • i: • 1 aintiff's motion fc • ] : summary 
judgment and submits the following memorandum in opposition. 
FACTS 
Defendant agrees with the facts as set forth 
in plaintiff's complaint and motion, except as follows: 
The legal conclusion in paragraph 4 of the 
complaint is unjustified. Although the accident occured 
in Nevada, all applications for benefits, actual benefits 
paid and contacts between the parties occured in Utah. 
The plainti£ f i s a Utah resident. 
t .'. As per Defendant's answer, the State of Utah 
pad d "!;: 1 5,01 8.41 in medical benefits on behalf c :!: Tammy 
Kadel as a result of the accident, but prior to her 
filed by the plaintiff on July 22, 19 8 5 and September 4, IS85, 
copies of which are attached as Exhibits "1 & 2". 
ARGUMENT I 
UTAH LAW SHOULD PREVAIL 
U t a h f c • ] 1 c > w ;E , t: I i € g e n e r a 1 r u! e t; h a 1 :i n p r c :i e d u r a 1 
issues the law of the forum state applies, whereas other 
issues are determined by the state where the issue arose. 
See Crofoot v.- Thatcher, 19 U. 212, 57 P. 1 1 ] (189 9) (Copy 
attached)* Defendant contends that Utah law should apply 
pursuant to thi s rul e. 
If thi s court determines .that subrogation is the 
issue upon which the conf] i c .t c f law should be determined, 
then pursuant to the majority line of cases as evidenced 
by the case of Aetna vsV RVO.-,- 298 S W 2d 293 (Kentucky 1957) 
(Copy attached)' the issue should be determined to be one 
of procedure and therefore apply the law of the forum, Utah. 
If the court determines that this is not one to 
be determined on procedural grounds, then defendant contends 
that this is an issue of contract which was entered into 
in Utah, and Utah lawshould be applied. Attached as Exhibits 
"1 & 2", are copies of two applications made by the plaintiff 
for medical and other welfare assistance. On the last page 
of the agreement is the following: 
nIn consideration of Medical Assistance, I 
assign to the Utah Department of Health all 
rights to benefits otherwise payable to me for 
medical services directly to the Department 
of Health. If I have a right of recovery 
under an insurance policy or against-a person 
medical expenses paid on my or my dependents 
behalf by the Utah Department of Health." 
Any'benefits paid were as a result of this agree-
men t • a n d 1 j t a 1 i 3 a w s 1 i o I 11 d a p p ] y . 
However, if this court should hold that Nevada 
law applies, then Nevada Revised Statutes, §422.293 would 
apply and the Court should apply the theory of equitabl e 
subrogation^. (Copy attached). 
ARGUMENT II-
EQUITABLE SUBROGATION DOES NOT APPLY UNDER UTAH LAW 
Mf-MiiCc. f I f ir! it.!" i i- r< i - u t ' i e c t tr o r , : f c b l t * 
subrogation arguments asserted here by.the plaintiff. 
Sect i on 26-1 9-5(1) U.C.A. (1984) makes 
it clear that the defendant has a direct right of recovery 
on its claim. This act amended what was previously 
Section 26 • i 9 • 4 which was enacted i n 2 9 61 a i i d ex p i e s sly 
used the term subrogation in explaining the right of the 
department • recover. One of 11 ie i: r::; i ici p .1 e reasons foi 
the revisions was the deletion of any reference to 
subrogation in the eld statute. (Copies of both sections 
attached) The intent of the legislature to allow for 
a direct right of recovery is clear. 
Although counsel has been unable to find any 
authority from Utah speaking directly to this issue, 
and couns e 1 be 1 :i e ve s thi s i s a c: ase i c • f f i n : s t imp r ess icn , 
- 3 -
there ere many cases from other jurisdictions on this issue. 
• important initially to make a distinction 
between * . t h statutory language c o ac 1 ied i i 1 ter ms c • f 
1
 subrogaticr '
 cr.c t- - .« c couched in terms of direct right 
C - - • - ::; c 2 tl€:: (5 ]l »V t h e p ] a 2 l i t II f f ! S DTI €: *'" 
deal with cases of the first type, which are not on pc.-*. 
In fact, one of the cases cited State v. Cowdell, 421 N.E. 2d 
667 (Ind. App. 1981) has been expressly overruled by 
Indiana Department of Public Welfare v. "Guardianship of 
Mclntyre, 47,3 N.E, 2d 6 (Ind. App, 1984), after the Indiana 
legislature amended its statute from one mentioning subrogation 
to one calling for a direct righ" " . .-..<-_-: Thereir the 
Court cited the case of Copli-en v. Department of Health and 
Social Services '(1984) 119 Wis. 2d 52, 34 9 N \ f. 2c 92 , a :  ,.c 
quoted that case as follows: "(such argument),,, is 'more 
appropriately addressed to the legislature than to this 
court. The legislature . . weighed medical recipients' 
need to be compensated for their injuries against the need 
for conservation of public funds and determined that the 
public funds have priority. We are required to apply the 
statute as it was written by the legislature." Id., 349 N.W. 2d 
at 95. See also Wright v. Department of Benefit Payments 
(1979) 90 Cal.App. ed 446, 153 Cal. Rptr. 474; Brown v. 
Stewart, (1982) App. 181 Cal. Rptr. 112; Hallmark Nursing 
Center Inc. v. Menaldino (1982) 88 A.2d 1042, 452 N.Y.S. 2d 
694; cf. Marmorino v. Newark Housing Authority (1983) 189 
All of the foregoing cases cited are in accord that 
equitable subrogation does not apply and the State Agency 
in question is entitled to full recovery. Defendant is 
unaware of any authority to the contrary involving statutes 
similar to that of Utah's. 
ARGUMENT III 
THE PROVISIONS OF 26-19-1,7(1) (a) ,7(2) ,13(2) , 9 
DO NOT MODIFY THE FOREGOING 
Plaintiff seeks to argue in his other points of 
argument that the statute in question modifies the rights 
of the defendant. These contention are without merit. 
Plaintiff initially argues that §26-19-1 and 7(1) 
(a) require apportionment between recovery for special and 
general damages. This language deals only with the relative 
rights of either party to proceed against third parties 
and does not in any way speak to the rights of settlement 
between the parties. The plaintiff in fact has violated 
this provision by proceeding to a settlement of all 
damages, as evidenced by the release attached to their 
motion, without the permission of the State. 
Plaintiff next argues that §26-19-13(2) prohibits 
this recovery unless the recipient was over 65 years of 
age. This provision deals only with medical assistance 
paid on behalf of recipients for which the department 
seeks recovery from the estate of that party where no third 
party is involved. Had the plaintiff made no recovery and 
this argument would have validity. Read in the context 
of the entire statute, it is a misconstruction. It is 
also important to note that the plaintiff failed to 
cite the entire section in his memorandumf stopping with 
the word assistance. The section has a provision at the 
end which reads ..."except as provided by Subsection 26-19-7 
(2) and (3)." These sections deal with the recovery from 
third parties as in this case and the Section does not 
apply. One hopes that this omission was not intentional. 
Plaintiff next contends that by failing to use the 
word lien in the reenactment of Section 26-19, the State 
has no lien on this recovery. Plaintiff fails to quote 
§26-19-7(2), which states that if the recipient proceeds 
without the State!s permission, as occured in this case, 
then ..."the department may recover in full from the 
recipient all medical assistance which it has provided..." 
Plaintiff finally claims that the recovery received 
October 2, 1985 and the release signed on November 20, 
1985, occured prior to the State having any rights. As 
shown by Exhibits "1 & 2" the State became invovled in 
July and again in September, prior to any recovery and 
certainly this argument is without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
The motion should be denied. 
-6-
Dated this 4th day of September, 1986. 
Douglas W. S^ra^rneyei 
^^istant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing was delivered this 4th day of September, 1986 
to the following: 
Daniel F. Bertch 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
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